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EXPLAINING RECENT TRENDS IN
U.S. HOMICIDE RATES
ALFRED BLUMSTEIN AND RICHARD ROSENFELD*"
I. THE CHANGING HOMICIDE RATE
During the past decade some sharp swings have occurred in
the homicide rate in the United States. The rate in 1980 was a
peak of 10.2 per 100,000 population, and by 1985 it fell to a
trough of 7.9. It then climbed a full 24% to a peak of 9.8 in
1991, and has been declining markedly since then, reaching a
level of 7.4 in 1996 (see Figure 1) and 6.8 in 1997, which is
lower than any annual rate since 1967.'
The jubilation over this decline is mixed with widespread
curiosity over the factors that are responsible for it. In this pa-
per, we explore some of those factors, focusing particularly on
those whose effects are reasonably measurable and where ag-
gregates may present a misleading picture. In some cases, for
example, we identify aspects of some variable contributing to an
increase in homicide and other aspects of the same variable
contributing to a decrease.
This is the case, for example, with age. During the late
1980s, young people were contributing to an increase in homi-
cides while older people were committing fewer homicides and
contributing to a decrease. In other cases, there are important
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interactions, for example, between race and age. A large in-
crease in homicide with handguns occurred among young Afri-
can-Americans in the late 1980s, but we observe no such
increase for older African-Americans.2 In such instances, demo-
graphic disaggregation is necessary to isolate the effects being
examined. A general theme of our discussion is that it is not
productive to think of homicide rates as unitary phenomena.
Rather, the recent change in the aggregate homicide rate is the
product of several distinct subgroup trends. Any credible ex-
planation-much less forecasting-of the overall change in homi-
cide rates, therefore, must make sense of multiple, interactive,
and sometimes countervailing influences.
Many explanations have been offered for the recent decline
in homicide rates. There have been claims, most notably by
New York City Mayor Rudolf Giuliani and William Bratton,
when he was New York's Police Commissioner, that virtually all
of the homicide drop in New York resulted from smart and ag-
gressive policing. Another view attributes the decline to a
change in some of the factors that contributed to the growth,
most importantly, a reduction in the high rates of firearm
homicide committed by (and mostly against) young people, par-
ticularly African-Americans.4 Some of this turnaround may be
the result of changes in policing, especially the use of aggressive
stop-and-frisk tactics to remove guns from kids, but other factors
could well be involved. These could include community efforts
to mediate inter-gang disputes, a greater availability of jobs in
the booming economy, changing drug markets with diminished
roles for young people, and growing incapacitation effects
through increases in the prison population. And, looking
'KATHLEEN MAGUIRE & ANN L. PASTORE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 1996,
at 339, Tables 3.130, 3.131(1997).
' See Fox Butterfield, Many Cities in U.S. Show Sharp Drop in Homicide Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
13, 1995, at Al; see also GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS:
RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 157, 259-60 (1997); George L.
Kelling & William J. Bratton, Declining Crime Rater Insiders' iews of the New York City Story, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1217 (1998); Clifford Krauss, N. Y. Crime Rate Plummets to Levels Not Seen
in 30 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1996, at Al; Alison Mitchell, Giuliani Cites Drop in Crime In As-
sessment N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1994, at B1.
4 SeeAlfred Blumstein & Daniel Cork, Linking Gun Availability to Youth Gun Violence, 59J.L. &
CON MP. PROBS. 5,5-24 (1996).
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across the nation, we will find that the effects of changes in the
large cities have a dominant effect on the aggregate rates.
In this article, we assess the influence on homicide trends of
some of these changes that have occurred during the last dec-
ade. - We begin by setting out some basic facts about recent
trends in homicide that any credible explanation must confront.
These include the differing patterns by age, recent demo-
graphic shifts, the role of weapons (particularly handguns) and
the domination of the national trends by the changes occurring
in the largest cities. We then evaluate several explanations for
the drop in homicide, devoting particular attention to explana-
tions which focus on the impact of declining or "maturing" drug
markets, growth in incarceration, economic expansion, changes
in family structure, and enforcement policy. We conclude with
some speculations about the changes in homicide rates likely to
occur over the next decade, given certain assumptions about
stability or change in the conditions that, in our view, have been
most closely associated with past trends.
II. THE RHETORICAL CONTEXT
We should say at the outset that it is not our intention to
engage in explicit forecasting of homicide trends. Forecasting
homicide became a popular academic pastime during the rapid
increase of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Some of the predic-
tions were accompanied by dire and dramatic warnings of an
impending crisis in criminal violence. One academic commen-
tator warned of a coming "blood bath" of juvenile and youth
violence that would inevitably accompany the increasing size of
the youthful segment of the population, even if their offending
rates did not go up.' Others characterized a subgroup of active
offenders as youthful "super predators" who would terrorize the
nation's cities.6 The motivation for this kind of rhetoric from
persons the public looks to for serious guidance on the crime
problem is unclear. The effect, however, has been to reinforce
'James A. Fox, Presentation to the Meeting of the American Academy for the Advancement
of Science (Feb. 19, 1995).
'WILLIAMJ. BENNETr ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY... AND How TO WIN AMERICA'S
WARAGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 25 (1996).
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an already overheated climate of opinion and policy regarding
the homicide problem. We do not wish to contribute further to
that rhetorical environment.
Claims of a rather different sort, coming primarily from
public officials, accompanied the drop in homicide rates in one
city after another in the early 1990s. As happened in New York,
the inclination to account for the local declines in terms of this
or that special local initiative apparently was all but irresistible.7
Not surprisingly, perhaps, very different types of causal rhetoric
dominate public discussion during periods of rising and falling
crime rates. During periods of increase, explanations tend to
emphasize the importance of immutable conditions or forces
for which public officials (at least those currently in office) can-
not reasonably be held accountable. Popular examples are
demographic changes caused by the birth rates of another dec-
ade, breakdowns in the family and other key institutions, and a
generalized decline in morality and civilized behavior. In con-
trast, when serious violence is on the decline, the imputed
causes are more often located in policies or practices for which
public officials are willing or eager to take credit, such as put-
ting more police on the street or more offenders in prison.
A kind of rhetorical bidding war began to emerge in the
early 1990s between some academic criminologists, who tended
to explain the decrease in homicide and other violent crimes in
terms of factors that were largely beyond the control of policy-
makers, and policy enthusiasts, who saw the decline as evidence
confirming the utility or wisdom of a favored program or prac-
tice. 8 This debate has a sterile and dogmatic quality that is un-
likely to advance understanding of the multiple and interacting
factors responsible for the rise and fall of homicide rates over
the past decade. Our view is that policy can make a difference,
but the difference it makes is highly dependent on existing lev-
els and trends in violent crime. We elaborate this position later
in the paper with reference to the dramatic decline in New York
City's homicide rate.9 Our point here is simply that the debate
See Butterfield, supra note 3, at A8.




over whether policy changes are responsible for the drop in
homicide has largely overlooked the question of how policy in-
teracts with other factors influencing trends in criminal vio-
lence. A key factor with which any policy assessment must
contend involves the sharply different trends in homicide by
age.
III. CHANGES IN AGE-SPECIFIC HOMICIDE ARREST RATES
An earlier paper in this Journal presented the striking
changes between 1985 and 1992 in age-specific arrest rates for
homicide. 10 That paper showed that, while the rates for persons
age eighteen and younger more than doubled, the rates for
those thirty and above declined by about 20-25%." We can now
extend those analyses to 1997, and we see some striking changes
in the younger group. Figure 2a presents the age-specific arrest
rate for murder for the years 1985, which was the last year of a
fifteen-year period of very stable age-specific rates, and 1993,
which was the peak year of juvenile age-specific rates. We see
that, even though the rates for ages twenty and under had more
than doubled over this interval, the rates for those over thirty
had indeed declined.
Figure 2b depicts the same 1993 situation along with the
figure for 1997, where we see the rates for all ages decline, with
the steepest decline around age eighteen, where the growth had
been greatest.
It is instructive to break out these changes in more detail by
looking at the time trends for each individual age. Figure 3 de-
picts the trend for the ages traditionally displaying the peak
homicide arrest rates, eighteen through twenty-four. We see
how similar those rates were from 1970 through 1985, and then
the divergence beginning in about 1985. The rate for the
eighteen-year-olds more than doubled by 1991, dropped in
1992, reached a new peak in 1993, and then declined for the
" Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry, 86 J. GRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 10, 10-36 (1995).
11 Id.
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next three years. The pattern is similar for the other ages de-
picted in Figure 3, although the rise in the late 1980s is less
steep with increasing age and the decline after 1993 is corre-
spondingly less for the older ages. For youth under eighteen,
the pattern is very similar, although the stable base rate in the
1970-1985 period is lower, but in all cases the rate more than
doubled by 1993. The pattern for the ages above twenty-four is
similarly flat through the mid 1980s, followed by a steady de-
cline for most of the ages.
These changes for the growth period, 1985 to 1993, and for
the decline period, 1993 to 1997, are reflected in Figure 4,
which depicts for each age the ratio of the age-specific arrest
rate for murder to the rates that prevailed in 1985. Points above
the heavy line (at the ratio of one) represent an increase in the
rates and points below that line represent a decrease. The up-
per graph portrays the ratio reached in the peak year, 1993, and
the lower graph portrays the degree to which the ratio had de-
clined by 1997.
Here, we see that the arrest rate for fifteen-year-olds in 1993
was triple the rate that had prevailed in 1985. The growth to
1993 declined with age, but it was more than double the 1985
rate for all ages of twenty and below. In contrast, for the older
ages of thirty and above, the 1993 rates were actually about 20%
lower than the 1985 rates. This divergence between the pat-
terns of young and old is striking and should be a central focus
of explanations of the recent homicide decline.
The graph of the 1997-to-1985 ratio is clearly below that for
1993, and the greatest decline occurred in the teenage years.
But it is clear that the teenage rates are still 60 to 80% above the
1985 rates that had prevailed since 1970. Accordingly, there is
still considerable room for improvement to get back down to
the 1985 rates.
Also, we note the continuing decline in the homicide rates
for the older ages. By 1996, the twenty-five to thirty year-old
group had declined from the 1985 rates by about 20%, and the
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These figures underscore the central importance of the dif-
ferent effects of different age groups in explaining the trends in
the aggregate homicide rate since 1985. The growth until the
1991 peak was caused because the rates of the younger people
were increasing faster than the rates for the older people were
declining. Between 1991 and 1993, the rates for younger peo-
ple were generally flat (as reflected in the pattern for the eight-
een-year-olds in Figure 3), and thus the decline among older
age groups dominated the aggregate, and so the down-turn be-
gan in 1992. And, since the rates of both young and old were
decreasing after 1993, the aggregate rate continued to fall.
In sum, all of the increase in the level of homicide in the
United States during the growth period of the late 1980s and
early 1990s was due to the trends in the younger ages, because
homicide rates for those twenty-five and older did not go up.
However, some of the decrease during the decline period since
1993 is due to the drop in offending among young people, and
some is attributable to the continuing decline in offending
among older persons. Even though they commit homicide at
much lower rates, the contribution of the older age groups to
the recent decline in the aggregate homicide rate may be ap-
preciable given their large numbers.
We have calculated the relative contribution of persons un-
der age twenty-five and those twenty-five and over to the total
decline in homicide since the 1993 peak in the juvenile rates.
Table 1 shows that total arrests for homicide dropped 21.6% by
1997, the last full year for which Uniform Crime Reports (UCR)
estimated arrest totals were available. As we have seen, the rate
of decrease at the younger ages has been somewhat greater than
for older persons. Estimated homicide arrests fell by 24.2% for
persons less than twenty-five-years-old and by 18% for those
twenty-five and over.
1186 [Vol. 88
RECENT TRENDS IN HOMCTDE RATES
Table 1.
Change in Homicide Arrests by Age Group, 1993 to 1997.
1993 1997 Change Percent Percent
Change of Total
Change




Suspects Un- 13,399 10,152 -3247 -24.2% 64.5%
der Age 25
Suspects Age 9929 8138 -1791 -18.0% 35.5%
25 and Over
Not surprisingly, given their sharply higher arrest rates,
younger persons contributed disproportionately to the overall
decline in homicide arrests. Over 5,000 fewer arrests were made
for homicide in 1997 than in 1993, and the decrease in arrests
of persons under age twenty-five accounted for almost two-thirds
of that total decline. However, over one-third of the drop in
homicide arrests was contributed by the decrease among older
adults.
Explanations of-the homicide decline that fail to take into ac-
count the factors responsible for the fall in homicide among adults
are, at best, incomplete. At worst, they will be misleading, because
these factors are not necessarily the same as those associated with the
drop in homicide offending in the younger groups.
IV. EFFECTS OF CHANGING DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION
Much of the speculation about the recent decline in homi-
cide rates attributes the decline to changing demographics.2
"Writing in the New York Times, David Kocieniewski states that "some [unnamed] criminolo-
gists attribute the decline to demographic factors like a smaller number or [sic] teenagers...."
David Kocieniewski, New York City Murder Rate May Hit 30-Year Low, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1997, at
11871998]
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This may be a hold-over from the realization that much of the
decline that began in 1980 was attributable to a demographic
shift, as the baby-boom generation aged out of the high-crime
ages.' 3 But those same demographic effects are not still at work
in the early 1990s, since demographic effects do not always have
to work in the same direction.
The decline after 1980 was significantly affected by the
shrinking size of the cohorts in the high-crime ages, but the U.S.
in the 1990s is in a period of growing cohort14 sizes in the late
teens and early twenties. Figure 5a depicts the age distribution
of the U.S. population in 1998. It is evident that the smallest
age cohort under forty is about twenty-two, the cohort born in
1976. Each of the younger cohorts is larger than its predecessor
until the peak at age six. Thus, if teen-age age-specific crime
rates were to remain constant, then the aggregate crime rate
would increase as a result of the larger cohort sizes. This possi-
bility spurred the warnings of a demographic "crime bomb" set
to go off during the 1990s.
15
Yet it is important to recognize that these age-composition
changes are relatively small, with cohort sizes growing at a rate
of about 1% per year. In the face of much larger swings in the
age-specific crime rates, as much as 10-20% up (in the 1980s) as
well as down (in the 1990s), the 1% change in demographic
composition is a minor effect.
Examining changes in age-composition by race (Figure 5b),
we see basically similar patterns for whites (which includes a
large majority of Hispanics) and blacks (whose number is scaled
up by a factor of seven to provide a comparison with whites).
The more recent growth rate for blacks at the younger ages is
BI. In an article on the "mystery" of the drop in crime, David Anderson notes that some analysts
explain the drop as resulting from "random demographic changes." David C. Anderson, The
Mysteiy of the Falling Crime Rate, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, May-June 1997, at 49.
"Alfred Blumstein et al., Demographically Disaggregated Projections of Prison Populations, 8 J.
CRIM.JUST. 1, 3-4 (1980); Darrell Steffensmeier & Miles D. Harer, Did Crime Rise or Fall During the
Reagan Presidency? The Effects of an "Aging" U.S. Population on the Nation's Crime Rate, 28 J. RES.
CRIME & DELINQ. 330, 331-2 (1991).
" In this context, a "cohort" refers to all the people born in the same year, so that the refer-
ence to "growing cohort sizes" indicates that there are more 18-year-olds than 19-year-olds, more
17-year-olds than 18-year-olds, etc.
5John J. Dilulio Jr., Rule of Lau. Why Violent Crime Rates have Dropped, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6,
1995, atA19.
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somewhat greater than that for whites, but even so, the growth
rate for black cohorts younger than the trough year of twenty-
two is still only about 2% per year, well below the swings in the
age-specific homicide rates.
Finally, it is possible that changes in relative cohort size
could alter the age-specific rates through mechanisms described
by Easterlin and others.6 However, the evidence suggests that if
changes in the relative size of age cohorts influence homicide
rates, the cohort effects are minor compared to age and period
effects.7
V. EXAMINING THE ROLE OF WEAPONS
There is widespread recognition of the changing role of
weaponry in young people's hands. Over the last decade the
weapons involved in settling juveniles' disputes have changed
dramatically from fists or knives to handguns, with their much
greater lethality. That growth in lethal weaponry is reflected in
the changes in the weapons involved in homicides in different
race and age groups.'8
The FBI's Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) provide
data to track such changes. Those reports, filed by individual
police departments, provide considerable detail on individual
homicide incidents. Each report contains information on the
victim and (where known) offender characteristics and their re-
lationship, the weapon involved in the homicide, and the cir-
cumstances leading up to the homicide, such as argument, drug
involvement, or gang involvement. Unfortunately, only a single
circumstance may be designated, and so time trends in the fash-
'6 RICHARD A. EASTERLIN, BIRTH AND FORTUNE (2d ed. 1987); M. Dwayne Smith, The Era ofln-
creased Violence in the United State. Ag Period, or Cohort Effect?, 27 SOC. Q. 239,239-51 (1986).
" See Paul S. Maxim, Cohort Size and Juvenile Delinquencyr A Test of the Easterlin Hypothesis, 63
Soc. FORCES 661 (1985); Robert M. O'Brien, Relative Cohort Size and Age-Specific Crime Rate. An
Age-Period-Relative-Colwrt-Size Model 27 CRIMINOLOGY 57 (1989); Darrell Steffensmeier et al., Co-
hort Size and An'est Rates Over the Life Course The Easterlin Hypothesis Reconsidered, 57 AM. Soc. REV.
306 (1992).
is Blumstein & Cork, supra note 4, at 5. See generally PhilipJ. Cook, Kids, Guns, and Public Pol-
icy, 59J.L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1996).
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ion with which police designate the single circumstance limit
the reliability of that aspect.'9
A. THE GROWTH PERIOD, 1985-1993
Figures 6a-6c provide information on the time trends of the
weaponry used in homicides by offenders in three age catego-
ries: adults, twenty-five to forty-five years old (Figure 6a); youth,
eighteen to twenty-four (Figure 6b); and juveniles, seventeen
and under (Figure 6c). The weapons are classified into three
groups: handguns; other guns; and non-guns (which includes
no physical weapon). We can see that over the time period
shown, 1977-1995, little meaningful change has occurred in the
use of handguns by adults. The situation for youth and juve-
niles is quite different, however. For both these groups, there
was no clear trend until 1986, and then a significant growth in
handgun use began. With 1985 as the base year, handgun
homicide among youth increased over 100% by 1994, and juve-
niles' use of handguns increased over 300%. In both these
groups, there is a leveling out from 1993 to 1994; we see a sharp
decline in 1995 and we anticipate a similarly sharp decline in
1996, consistent with the decline in homicide arrest rates shown
in Figure 3.
" The number of incidents reported by an agency to the SHR is close to, but not identical to
the number of incidents reported to the FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). The variation can
result from differences in the reporting procedures when different segments of the police de-
partment handle the two reporting tasks. A number of jurisdictions have varied considerably
over time in the number of incidents reported to the SHR, including years when they simply
submitted no reports at all. Rather than misrepresent fluctuations in reporting as changes in
homicides, we have omitted from our analyses those places that display such large fluctuations.
1192 [Vol. 88
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In all these figures, no appreciable increase has occurred in
either the long-gun or the non-gun categories. There has been
some decline in the non-gun category for youth, but this decline
(28% from 1985 to 1994) is small compared to the more than
100% growth in their use of handguns. Thus, we observe that
the growth in homicides by young people, which accounted for
all the growth in homicides in the post-1985 period, was ac-
counted for totally by the growth in homicides committed with
handguns. Clearly, the sharply increasing prevalence of hand-
guns in youth and juvenile homicide must be considered of
fundamental importance in any explanation of the homicide
increase of the late 1980s and early 1990s.
We also observe some important racial differences in the
growth of handgun homicides, with the dominant growth being
among African-American young people, both as offenders and
as victims. Figure 7 presents the number of homicides commit-
ted by black youth, 18-24, and displays the sharp growth, more
than tripling from the low in 1984 to the peak in 1993. There
was no comparable growth in the role of the other weapon
types.
While some growth also occurred in handgun homicides by
white youth, that growth was far less than among the black
youth. The difference is depicted in Figure 8, which compares
the two racial groups. This figure focuses on all cities over
100,000 population, and includes in the "white" group all those
also classified as Hispanic. Here we see the strong growth in
handgun prevalence for black youth, from a low in 1984 to a
tripling by 1993. The rise for the whites does not start until
1989, but does display a doubling by the 1993 peak. Finally, the
post-1993 decline is much sharper for the black youth than
among young whites.
1196 [Vol. 88
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B. THE DECLINE PERIOD, 1993-1996
Because the available SHR data extend only a few years into
the decline period, we cannot be as confident about how chang-
ing patterns of weapon use may have contributed to the decline.
However, the flattening of the growth in the handgun homicide
rate between 1993 and 1994 is consistent with the decline in
youth homicide rates shown in Figure 3, suggesting that the de-
cline in homicide is also associated with the decline in the use of
handguns by young people.
The pattern of growth and decline in handgun use also is
reflected in Figures 9a and 9b, which depict the time trend in
the rate of weapons arrests at the various ages. The pattern
here is very similar to the homicide patterns depicted in Figure
3, but there is a much more distinct peaking in 1993, with a
clear decline subsequently. Changes in the rate of weapons ar-
rests result from a combination of changes in the presence of
weapons in the population and changes in police aggressiveness
in pursuing illegal weapons. It is clear from other data that
there was considerable growth in weapon prevalence during the
late 1980s and also that police became more concerned about
weapons, especially in the hands of young people.2 0 That com-
bination is reflected in the rise in weapons arrests until the peak
in 1993. There is no indication that there was any abatement by
police in their concern about young people's guns after 1993,
and so it seems likely that the decline after 1993 is due -much
more to a reduction in the carrying of guns than to a slackening
of police efforts to capture the guns. The reduction in carrying
seems to have contributed to the decrease in homicide by young
people.
See, for example, Blumstein & Cork, supra note 4, and, more generally, 59J.L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS., supra note 4.
1998] 1199
1200 BLUMSTEIN & ROSENFELD [Vol. 88
0
. . . . . .
,-C-
...... . ...... .... .. - - -
--- -- -  O00- OO- - ----
t t
Q - - - - -- -- - - -- -- - -------
uoqvlnclo ooo'oo1 xad aj
RECENT TRENDS IN HOMCIHDE RATES
00
*I J------------------- ---- ---- ----- ---------- ----- ---------
-- - ..
-m
0 0 1- 0D 0* m
:~ ',
uo.aieindod O00'OOI ad a0,j
1998] 1201
BLUMSTEIN & ROSENFELD
VI. ROLE OF THE BIG CITIES
The largest cities contribute disproportionately to patterns
of serious violence for the nation as a whole. The prominent
role of the large cities is clearly evident in the trends in homi-
cide. Based on UCR data for 1991, for example, the U.S. expe-
rienced 24,700 homicides. 21  New York City alone provided
2,154 of them, or about 9% of the total.2  As New York City's
homicide rate has declined faster than the national rate, its per-
centage contribution to the total has dropped to a value below
5%.
Although no other city has as large an effect as New York,
the importance of the large cities is reflected in the relative con-
tribution they make to the total homicide picture. In 1996, ten
cities (New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Detroit, Philadelphia,
Washington, New Orleans, Baltimore, Houston, and Dallas, in
order of decreasing numbers of homicides) accounted for fully
one-quarter of all the nation's homicides. In contrast, in 1991,
when New York alone accounted for 9% of all U.S. homicides,
only seven cities (New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit,
Houston, Dallas, and Washington) were needed to account for a
quarter of U.S. homicides.23
New York City has been a major contributor to the national
decline since the early 1990s. In the national net decline in
homicides from 1993 to 1994 (a reduction of 1,200 homicides),
New York City's drop of 385 accounted for 32% of that change.24
In the net change from 1994 to 1995 (a national net drop of
1,720 homicides), New York City's drop of 384 accounted for
22% of the total decrease. 25 New York City's contribution to the
drop since 1995 has been closer to 10%,26 still very large, but
" UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1991, at 59
(1991).
22 Id. at 139.
" Id. at 108 tbl.8; UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1996, at 112 tbl.8 (1996).
" UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1993, at 139
tbl.8 (1993); UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES,
1994, at 138 tbl.8 (1994).
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smaller than in the earlier years, in part because the smaller cit-
ies are beginning to catch up. It is thus clear that what goes on
in New York City, or the largest cities more generally, can have a
very powerful effect on national statistics.
Examination of the trends over time offers a compelling
picture of the saliency of the large cities, both in the rise of
homicide in the 1980s and the decline during the 1990s. Fig-
ures 10a (for homicides with other than handguns) and 10b
(for homicides with handguns) uses the Supplementary Homi-
cide Reports to estimate the number of homicides in each of
four groups of cities (those of 1 million or more, those in the
range of 500,000 to 1 million, 250,000 to 500,000, and 100,000
to 250,000).27
Because the number of homicides associated with each of
the city-size groups other than the largest is roughly the same in
each year,28 we can discuss these results as associated with the
large cities and contrast them with the smaller cities. There
were six cities in the million-plus group: New York, Detroit,
Philadelphia, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Dallas.2
Figure 10a shows limited variation associated with the non-
handgun homicides. There was very little change in the smaller
cities, and a rather gradual decline of 18% in the large cities
from a peak in 1986 through 1993, with a comparable drop of
21% from 1993 to 1994.
But the non-handgun homicide changes were much smaller
than those in the handgun homicides. Figure 10b shows that
2Each individual city was assigned to a "city size" category based on its mean population over
the period 1988 to 1992 in order to ensure that each category contained the same cities over the
period shown. Without some such stabilizing assignment rule, this assignment would vary over
time and would by itself affect the group rates whenever a change took place. Because the
homicide rate is positively related to population, as cities grow and move from one class to a
higher one, even if there were no change in any city's homicide rate, that movement alone
would reduce the homicide rate in the group they left, but also reduce it in the group they
moved up to. These effects would be negligible among the large numbers of smaller cities, but
could be very influential among the smaller numbers of the largest cities.
' This is partly a result of the fact that, as the population size approximately halves between
groups, the number of cities approximately doubles, thereby keeping the number of homicides
roughly stable.
"Some cities, including Chicago and Houston, were not included here because their report-
ing to the SHR was sporadic, and we did not want to attribute these fluctuations in reporting to
changes in the homicide patterns being observed.
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BLUMSTE1N & ROSENFELD
the large cities had a major growth beginning in 1986, increas-
ing 85% from 1985 to the flat 1991-1993 peak, and then declin-
ing 37% to the low in 1995 with indications that that decline will
continue, at least for some period into the future.
We note that the smaller cities also had a distinct up-turn in
the handgun homicides, but that the up-turn did not begin un-
til 1988, two years later than in the large cities. That up-turn
was even larger in percentage terms, collectively increasing
116% from the trough in 1987 to the collective peak in 1994.
The more recent down-turn also began later than in the large
cities: in 1994 in the 250,000-500,000 cities and not until 1995 in
the other two groups. The drop from the collective 1993 peak
was still only about 16% in 1995.0
The rise in the handgun homicides could be associated with
crack markets, as hypothesized by Blumstein.3' Since crack
markets generally emerged first in the largest cities, and may
have diffused to smaller cities at a later time, that could possibly
account for these lag effects.
It is also the case that the peak occurs later in the smaller
cities. It is reached in 1991 in the largest cities, and the lag is
larger as the city size grows smaller. We also note that the de-
cline in the largest cities is quite sharp after the flat 1991-1993
peak. In the smaller cities, however, a comparable sharp de-
cline was not yet displayed by 1995. Indeed, news reports in
1997 and 1998 chronicled the escalating homicide rates in some
mid-sized cities and speculated that these increases could be as-
sociated with the later emergence of crack markets and associ-
ated drug-related violence. 3
To the extent that both the increase and down-turn in
handgun homicides in the largest cities are associated with cor-
'0 These trends in firearm and non-firearm homicide as reflected in offending by city size are
very consistent with the homicide trends of victimization within urbanization strata reported in
Lois A Fingerhut et al., Homicide Rates Among US Teenagers and YoungAdultc. Differences by Meda-
nism, Level of Ubanization, Race, and Sex, 1987 through 1995, 280JAMA 423, 423-427 (1998).
"See Blumstein, supra note 10, at 29-32.
"This diffusion was hypothesized by Blumstein, supra note 10, and evidence for it was pro-
vided by Golub and Johnson. ANDREW LANG GOLUB & BRUCE D.JOHNSON, U.S. DEP'T OFJUST.,
RESEARCH IN BRIEF, CRACK'S DECLINE: SOME SURPRISES ACROSS U.S. CrrIE (1997).
" See, e.g., Michael Janofsky, Missing Trend, Some Cities See Murders Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
1998, at A16.
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responding changes in crack markets, we would anticipate that
homicide rates in the smaller cities should be reaching a peak
and in some instances beginning to decline. The timing of
these changes should correspond with city size: the declines
should begin first in larger cities and later in the smaller cities.
SHR data beyond 1995 will be needed to confirm these specula-
tions about the role of drug markets in the increase and the de-
cline of U.S. homicide rates, and in the differences in the
timing of these changes observed across cities of different sizes.
However, the observed patterns are highly consistent with ex-
planations of homicide trends that assign central importance to
the rise and decline of crack in the United States.
VII. SOME OBSERVATIONS AND SPECULATIONS ABOUT CAUSES
OF THE DECLINE
It has been striking to note the sharp rise in homicide dur-
ing the late 1980s and the correspondingly sharp decline in the
1990s. The increase in the aggregate homicide rate was due to
escalating rates among juveniles and youth, predominantly (al-
though not exclusively) by and against black males, particularly
in the larger cities and exclusively involving handguns. In 1996,
the decline is still less than half-way to the stable rate that pre-
vailed for the fifteen years from 1970 through 1985. But we are
not necessarily at the end of the down-turn of the cycles, and
there is some reason to hope that the declines will continue.
If the observed process of a rise followed by a subsequent
decline is indeed cyclical with a reasonably well-defined cycle
time, perhaps the difference between the larger and the smaller
cities is merely one that reflects the lag in the initiation of this
process: the large cities started first, and then the smaller ones
followed, roughly in order of their size. Subsequent data from
the smaller cities over the next few years will be available to test
this speculation. If this speculation is in fact confirmed, that
opens the questions, first, of the forces driving this cyclical pro-
cess, both up and down, and, second, of the factors contributing
to the lag between the larger and the smaller cities. Here again,
we can only speculate. The evidence available so far, while short
of providing unambiguous confirmation, is largely consistent
1998] 1207
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with the earlier hypothesis of the sequence that created the rise
phase: introduction of crack in the mid-1980s; recruitment of
young minority males to sell the drugs; arming of the drug sell-
ers with handguns; diffusion of guns to peers; irresponsible and
excessively casual use of guns by young people, leading to a
"contagious" growth in homicide.3
There is still no comparably strong hypothesis about the de-
cline period, but a variety of forces are likely implicated, some
more salient in some places and others elsewhere. These can be
grouped as: (1) independent forces that came about on their own
and contributed to the decline; and (2) reactive forces that re-
sponded to the growth in homicide to stop the rise and turn it
down.
Although the two types of factors are distinct from one an-
other in important respects, their impact on homicide rates is
fundamentally interactive: multiple factors are almost certainly
responsible for the recent homicide decline, and the effective-
ness of any single factor depends on the presence of others. We
illustrate this contention in concluding remarks about some of




The independent forces could be of many forms. One in-
volves the changes in the nature of the demand for drugs, as
identified by Golub and Johnson.35 As the number of new crack
users diminished in the early 1990s, that could well have
brought some stability to drug markets, allowing them to func-
tion in a more secretive and surreptitious manner off the
streets, and reducing the need to keep recruiting young people
who are irresponsible with the use of violence. Those altera-
tions could well have been amplified by the maturity of those
managing the supply side of the market, many of whom were
'Blumstein, supra note 10, at 29-31. See also Colin Loftin, Assaultive Violence as a Contagious So-
cial Process, 52 BuLL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 550, 550-55 (1986).
'GoLuB &JOHNSON, supra note 32.
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the survivors of the early violent period and had time and op-
portunity to develop dispute-resolution mechanisms other than
the use of violence, much as their Mafia predecessors had done
a generation earlier.
We acknowledge the absence of systematic evidence for the
salience of any such maturation process, either in the markets
or in the individual sellers or buyers. However, explanations of
the homicide decline that emphasize the central role of changes
in drug markets are a promising point of departure for the nec-
essary research. For one thing, they are causally symmetrical:
they account for both the increase and the decline in violence.
Rates of serious violence, including homicide, went up during
the rise phase of the crack epidemic and have been dropping
during the decline phase. As the crack epidemic spread in the
mid to late 1980s, so did the danger around inner city drug
markets, driving up the incentive for more kids to arm them-
selves in an increasingly threatening environment. That envi-
ronment also became a prime recruiting ground for urban
street gangs. Once kids acquired guns to protect themselves
from other kids, a classic arms race began, and firearm violence
diffused away from the drug markets. 7
As the crack epidemic began to abate in the early 1990s,
levels of firearm violence fell as well, although some lag should
be expected due to the self-perpetuating, "contagious" quality of
an arms race. The drug market-firearm diffusion hypothesis,
then, is suggestive of an epidemic-like process inherent in the
growth and decline of homicide. Indeed, an important reason
why public health terms like "contagion" and "epidemic" may
have more than merely metaphorical significance for explana-
tions of serious criminal violence lies in the intriguing connec-
tion between the recent cycles of violence and drug use in the
United States.
'Eric Baumer et al., The Influence of Crack Cocaine on Robbey, Burglay, and Homicide Rate. A
Cross-City, LongitudinalAnalysis, 35J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 316, 316-340 (1998); Butterfield, su-
pra note 3, at A10; PAMELA K. LATTIMORE ET AL., U.S. DEP'TJUST., RESEARCH IN BRIEF, A STUDY
OF HOMICIDE IN EIGHT U.S. CITIES: AN NIJ INTRAMURAL RESEARCH PROJECT (1997).
'JOSEPH F. SHELEY &JAMES D. WRIGHT, IN THE LINE OF FIRE: YOUTH, GUNS, AND VIOLENCE IN
URBAN AMERICA 150, 154-56 (1995). Blumstein, supra note 10, at 30.
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The focus on changes in drug markets also helps to account
for the variable timing of the peaks and declines in homicide
across cities. A large coastal city such as New York, for example,
where crack took hold earlier and where it peaked sooner than
in other cities, 8 should have experienced a drop in its rate of
homicide sooner than in other cities-and it did. An additional
advantage of the drug-market hypothesis is that it directs atten-
tion to the population groups in which the changes in homicide
were concentrated: youth, not necessarily as drug users, but as
attractive sellers because of their reduced legal liability, and on
African-American youth in particular, who disproportionately
participated as sellers in inner-city crack markets.39
2. Economic Expansion
Some of the recent decline in homicide rates is almost cer-
tainly related to the economic expansion of the past six years.
Unemployment rates have dropped to levels not seen since the
early 1970s, and consumer confidence is higher than in nearly
three decades. Importantly, economic gains have been shared
by racial minorities, teenagers, and high school dropouts,
groups at disproportionate risk for serious criminal violence. 1
The role of opportunities in the legitimate labor market in-
teracts in complex ways with changes in the illicit opportunity
structure of distressed urban communities. The availability of
low-wage jobs in the secondary labor market is particularly rele-
vant when illicit markets and the employment opportunities
they offer are shrinking. The conventional view of the connec-
tion between employment and crime portrays individuals, espe-
cially teenagers and youth, as turning to criminal activity when
mSee GOLUB &JOHNSON, supra note 32, at 3.
"This is reflected in the sharp rise in the arrest rate of non-white juveniles for drug offenses
in the late 1980s. See, for example, Blumstein, supra note 10, at 28 fig.10.
'See, e.g., Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Confidence of Consumers is Surging, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1997,
at Cl; Robert D. Hershey,Jr., US Jobless Rateedines to 4.7%, Lowest Since 1973, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
8, 1997, at Al; Louis Uchitelle, 6 Years in the Plus Column for the US Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
1997, at C1.
" See Sylvia Nasar, Jobs Juggernaut Continues Surge, 300,000 Find Work, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1998,
at Al.
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their legitimate employment opportunities are restricted.42 The
relationship is likely to operate in the other direction also.
Young people can also turn to legitimate jobs in response to
dwindling opportunities for illegitimate work. Evidence from
Freeman13 suggests that low-income teenagers will substitute il-
legitimate for legitimate work when the perceived rewards of
doing so outweigh the costs, and that a sizable fraction of inner-
city young men engage in both legal and illegal activity at the
same time, moving back and forth from one to the other as op-
portunity permits. He explains that "Someone may need help
selling stolen goods; a car with a stereo may be parked on a de-
serted street; the local fast food franchise or supermarket may
be hiring. If the opportunity is there, and if the likely gain ex-
ceeds the reservation wage, someone will act on it."
44
These observations imply that the effects on criminal in-
volvement of legitimate and illegitimate opportunities are fun-
damentally interactive: when the supply of illegitimate
opportunities drops, the demand for legitimate work increases.
If the assessments of the decline in crack markets in large cities
in recent years are correct, then the movement to legitimate
employment should have a particularly pronounced effect on
the level of criminal involvement of low-skilled teenagers, and
especially on their willingness to risk the serious violence associ-
ated with drug markets. There may be much to criticize about
the low-end "go nowhere" jobs produced during the economic
expansion of the 1990s, but they do employ teenagers-they are
the only kind of jobs for which the great majority of teenagers
are qualified-and they do reduce their risk of being victims
and offenders.
Whatever the other drawbacks of flipping hamburgers or
bagging groceries, kids are far less likely to kill or to be killed
when working in a fast-food restaurant or supermarket than
" Emilie Andersen Allan & Darrell J. Steffensmeier, Youth, Undermployment, and roperly
Cime: Differential Effects ofJob Availability and Job Quality on Juvenile and Adult Arrest Rates, 54 Am.
Soc. Rev. 107, 107-123 (1989).
' RICHARD B. FREEMAN, CRIME AND THE JOB MARKET (National Bureau of Econ. Research
Working Paper No. 4910, 1994); RICHARD B. FREEMAN, WHYDO So MANYYOUNG AMERICAN MEN
COMMIT CRIMEs AND WHAT MIGHT WE Do ABOUT IT? (National Bureau of Econ. Research,




when selling crack on the street corner outside. These effects,
however, are inherently short-term, not only because of the cy-
clical character of legitimate employment opportunities, but
also because jobs in the secondary labor market are not, by
themselves, a strong foundation for the kind of long-term inte-
gration in the mainstream economic and social life of a com-
munity that is necessary to permanently reduce the economic
attractions of crime. It would be very unwise policy to count on
purely cyclical forces, and their interaction with changes in ille-
gitimate income opportunities, to prevent youth crime and vio-
lence. Many kids involved in the illegal drug business
apparently resort to legitimate employment only when other
money-making options are closed off. After the police had
temporarily suppressed the crack markets in New Haven in the
mid-1990s, for example, a former drug seller lamented: "People
are scared now, so they're just getting, like, jobs." The boy's
tone was described as "pitying, appalled" by the journalist who
interviewed him, who concluded: 'Jobs were apparently only for
the truly desperate." 45 Although low-wage jobs can have impor-
tant short-term preventive effects, longer term benefits will re-
quire education and training programs that prepare teenagers
in the work skills, habits, and discipline they will need as adults
and that operate during periods of economic decline as well as
expansion.
3. Incarceration Effects
Although in one sense changes in sentencing policy and re-
sulting changes in the level of imprisonment are clearly "reac-
tive" with respect to the problem of criminal violence, we
include them as independent forces in our discussion because
the dramatic growth in incarceration began a decade before
homicide rates went up in the mid-1980s. Incarceration effects
are undoubtedly an important contributor to the continuing
decline of homicide rates among older people (as displayed in
William Finnegan,Job Gap Results in Shrinking Middle Class, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,July 8,
1998, at B7; see also, BRUCE A. JACOBS, DEALING CRACK: THE SOCIAL WORLD OF STREET CORNER
SELLING (1999).
"' For one set of proposals, see WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE
WORLD OFTHE NEw URBAN POOR 207-38 (1996).
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Figure 4), especially for those over thirty, who displayed a 40%
drop in homicide rates between 1985 and 1997. This connec-
don is particularly close because the median age of prisoners is
about thirty-two.
One of the contributors to the growth in incapacitation ef-
fects is the large number of drug sellers who have been sen-
tenced to prison in the last two decades. Ironically, they have
not been major contributors to a decline in drug offending be-
cause they have been replaced by other sellers, but, as long as
they have any risk of committing homicide, they have contrib-
uted to the decline in homicide rates. Unfortunately, however,
we cannot at this time isolate these incapacitation effects from
other effects contributing to a decline in homicide by older
people, such as the effects of the reductions in intimate-partner
homicide.
Incarceration effects are far less likely to have been a signifi-
cant factor in the more recent decline in homicide rates among
teenagers and youth and most likely limited to older youth
whose incarceration risk is greatest. In addition, levels of homi-
cide have fallen in the younger age groups in recent years even• • 47
as their incarceration risk has increased. It is possible of
course that the decline might have been less steep in the ab-
sence of the "get tough on kids" sentencing policies enacted in
recent years.
4. Declining 'Domesticity" and Intimate Partner Homicide
In addition to the incapacitation effects of increasing incar-
ceration on adults, there has been a sustained drop in homi-
cides involving spouses, ex-spouses, and other intimate partners
over the past two decades.8 This decrease, which is especially
pronounced among African-American adults, results from a
corresponding drop in "domesticity," that is, declining marriage
rates, increasing age at marriage, and high divorce rates. 9 Some
preliminary evidence suggests that the increasing availability of
" MELISSA SICKMUND Er AL, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1997 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE
28-32,39 (1997).
"LAWRENCEA. GREENFELD, US DEP'TJUSTICE, VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES (1998).
'Richard Rosenfeld, Changing Relationships Between Men and Women: A Note on the Decline in In-
timatePartnerHomicide, 1 HOMICIDESTUD. 72-83 (1997).
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legal advocacy and other domestic violence services also may
have played a role.50
B. REACTIVE FORCES
1. Police Programs to Remove Guns from Kids
Notable among the reactive forces are police efforts to re-
move guns from kids. These tactics could include a mixture of
aggressive stop-and-frisk detentions, especially in high-violence
neighborhoods (reputed to have been an important part of the
response in New York City),51 introduction of programs offering
a bounty for reports of illegal guns that would lead to confisca-
tion (undertaken in Charleston, South Carolina, with apparent
success),52 and "voluntary" searches of homes suspected of con-
taining illegal weapons (with an agreement to confiscate the
weapons but with a commitment not to press criminal charges
for the possession) carried out in St. Louis.53 The theory behind
the confiscation strategies lies not only in the benefits of the
confiscation itself, but in the broader deterrent threat that the
risk of confiscation has on the carrying of the weapons or on the
brandishing of a gun. To the extent that the carrying is re-
duced thereby, it in turn reduces the concern over self-
protection, and thereby diminishes the incentive for others to
carry their own guns. Thus, the contagious escalation character-
istic of the rise period can display a similar contagion process of
disarmament during the decline period.
Enforcement activity and related community-based reactive
forces almost certainly have contributed to the drop in homi-
cide in specific localities. However, the magnitude of this effect
is difficult to gauge, because levels of homicide also have de-
creased in places with no discernible change in enforcement
and because the effects of enforcement tend to interact with
' Laura Dugan et al., Explaining the Decline in Intimate Partner Homicide: The Effects of Changing
Domesticity, Women's Status, and Domestic Violence Resources, 3 HOMICIDE STUDIES (forthcoming
1999).
SWILLIAM BRATrON & PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND: How AMERICA'S TOP COP REVERSED
THE CRIME EPIDEMIC (1998).
"' Interview by with Chief Reuben Greenberg, Police Chief, Charleston, S.C. (Mar. 1995).
" Richard Rosenfeld & Scott H. Decker, Consent to Search and Seize Evaluating an Innovative
Youth l'ibea m Suppression Program, 59J.L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 197-220 (1996).
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other influences over which the police and community leaders
have little control. Los Angeles, for example, has seen large de-
creases in its own homicide rates, but we have seen no indica-
tion of actions they have taken to achieve that decrease.
Understanding the interactions among the reactive and inde-
pendent forces responsible for the recent decline in homicide
rates should help policy makers and the public think more real-
istically about what communities can and cannot do when the
rates turn up again.
2. Community Efforts
Other reactive forces would include community efforts to
stop and reverse the escalation process. " These efforts may be
independent of the police, but could well involve community-
policing resources when those were seen as relevant. These can
take the form of mediation and negotiation between conflicting
gangs, mentoring programs, hands-are-not-for-guns campaigns,
and introduction of various community-center activities (e.g.,
"midnight basketball"), all stimulated by a community's concern
over the escalating violence in its midst. One promising model
for such community-policing partnerships is Boston's Cease Fire
project, which combines highly targeted law enforcement inter-
ventions with prevention programs and has stimulated replica-
tions in several other cities.55
VIII. SUMMARY
It is clear that the candidate factors contributing to the de-
cline in homicides over the past several years are numerous and
complex, and could well differ in different places. A significant
aspect of the improvement involved undoing the factors that
contributed to the growth in the late 1980s-especially kids car-
rying and using guns and thereby stimulating others to do like-
wise. Efforts in that direction have been carried out by both
See, e.g., Warren Friedman, Volunteerism and the Decline of Violent Crime, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1453, 1462-63 (1998).
David Kennedy & Anthony Braga, Homicide in Minneapolis. Research for Problem Solving, 2
HOMICIDE STUD. 263, 263-90 (1998); David Kennedy et al., Youth iolence in Boston: Gun Markets,




police and community groups. Much of the decline may be at-
tributable to incapacitation associated with the doubling of the
incarceration rate since 1985, but that effect shows itself only in
reductions in older individuals, since young people are only
rarely candidates for incarceration. That emphasizes the impor-
tance of efforts to prevent homicide by finding ways to socialize
the young and train them with the skills necessary to function in
a rapidly evolving economy. Current economic conditions seem
to have provided legitimate economic opportunities at the same
time that opportunities in the illicit drug markets were dimin-
ishing, but the cyclical nature of economic conditions makes
their crime reduction effects uncertain in the future. There is
undoubtedly a connection between illicit drug markets, particu-
larly crack markets, and violence, but the nature of that connec-
tion is undoubtedly very complex and is not effectively
addressed simply through prohibition of the drugs or through
"cracking down" on the participants in the markets. Treating
addicts medically, for example, could diminish the activity in
the markets and could well diminish the violence as a result.
As we look to the future, we must anticipate that the recent
declines could well be reversed. This could occur through a re-
surgence of active drug markets and the violence that can ac-
company them through a downturn in the economy and the
impact that would have in the communities where violence is
most likely to re-ignite, and through the dropping from welfare
rolls the remaining individuals who are least able to transition
into the legitimate economy. We cannot be certain when the
next increase in homicide will occur, but the current decline
cannot continue indefinitely, and we should take the opportu-
nity it offers to fashion criminal justice and community-based
policies to prepare for the next increase.
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